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I. **RELIEF REQUESTED**

2 Pursuant to Washington Court Civil Rules 56 (a) and (d), Plaintiffs Seattle Vacation 3 Home, LLC and Andrew Morris move that this Court: 1) deny the motion for summary 4 judgment filed by defendant City of Seattle as premature, and 2) declare that the test adopted by 5 the Washington Supreme Court in Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wn.2d 320, 787 6 P.2d 907 (1990), controls Plaintiffs' substantive due process claim under Article I § 3 of the 7 Washington Constitution.

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II. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

9 Since 2018, Seattle has restricted the number of properties that any individual (or 10 married couple) may offer as short-term rentals. Previously, they could offer an unlimited 11 number of properties as short-term rentals. Now, pursuant to City Ordinance 125490, they may 12 only offer two properties and, if they choose, their own primary residence as short-term rentals. 13 Plaintiffs challenge these restrictions on three grounds: (1) as a violation of Plaintiffs' right to 14 substantive due process under Article I § 3 of the Washington Constitution; (2) as a violation of 15 their federal right to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) as a 16 violation of the privileges and immunities clause (Art. I § 12) of the Washington Constitution.

17 While the proper standard of review is different for each claim, the City's motion for 18 summary judgment should be denied as premature because all three standards of review require 19 the Court to examine the evidence proffered by the parties, and the parties have stayed 20 discovery by stipulation and agreement. Plaintiffs believe resolution of this case depends on the 21 development of facts through discovery and that the facts alleged by Defendants in support of 22 their motion are in dispute—a dispute which precludes the issuing of summary judgment.

23 24

For instance, Plaintiffs plan to depose City officials about the City's purported justifications for the new law and any evidence that might support those justifications. Plaintiffs 25 have even noticed that deposition. Notice of 30(b)(6) Deposition attached as Appendix 1. But 26 after Plaintiffs set this deposition, counsel for the City called counsel for Plaintiffs and asked for 27 a stay of discovery. The Plaintiffs agreed to that because both parties recognized that they 28 disagreed about the proper standard of review for the state substantive due process claim.

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Counsel for Plaintiffs therefore agreed to withdraw the deposition notice, so that the parties
 could resolve that legal question first.
 Therefore, on March 26 of this year, the parties submitted a Stipulation to Change Trial

Date and Amend Case Schedule (attached as Appendix 2) so that the standards of review could
be determined. That joint stipulation states, at relevant part, that:

The parties intend to file cross-motions for summary judgment, regarding the constitutional standard of review, on an agreed briefing schedule, to be heard by the Court on June 21, 2019. The parties have also agreed to a stand down on discovery and objections thereto until they can obtain rulings on the cross-motions, which may resolve or moot a number of discovery-related issues. The parties agree that good cause exists to extend the deadlines in the case schedule, including the trial date, by approximately four months, and respectfully request the Court to do so.

(emphasis added)

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According to the parties' agreement that their cross-motions for summary judgment would solely address the legal question of the proper standard of review in this case, the Plaintiffs have not conducted the discovery to which they are entitled. Yet the City's motion for summary judgment goes beyond the legal dispute and also asks the Court to enter full summary judgment for the City. That motion should be denied, because Plaintiffs require discovery on all three of their constitutional claims.

In addition to denying the City's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs also ask the 19 Court to decide the legal issue of whether the substantive, three-part analysis from *Presbytery* 20 controls their substantive due process claim under the Washington Constitution. Contrary to the 21 City's argument, Washington Courts have never abandoned Presbytery, silently or otherwise. 22 Instead, they continue to apply it to property rights cases involving substantive due process 23 claims. In Yim v. City of Seattle, No. 958131, Wash. Sup. Ct. (filed Aug. 24, 2018), the 24 question of *Presbytery*'s continuing applicability is currently pending before the state Supreme 25 Court. The City is the appellant in that case, and counsel for Plaintiffs has submitted an *amicus* 26 brief in favor of the respondent. Among other issues, the parties in that case have asked the 27 Supreme Court to consider whether *Presbytery* still controls. Briefing is complete, and oral 28

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1	argument is scheduled for June 11. If this Court does not believe it can rule on the proper			
2	standard of review while Yim is pending, Plaintiffs suggest staying this case until the Court			
3	issues its opinion in Yim.			
4	III. STATEMENT OF FACTS			
5	Home-sharing is the rental of one's property—from a single room to an entire			
6	house—on a short-term basis. Seattle defines a short-term rental as a rental, for pay, of fewer			
7	than 30 nights. Seattle, Wash., Mun. Code § 6.600.030.			
8	Plaintiff Andrew Morris started conducting short-term rentals in 2015, with one			
9	property. Declaration of Andrew Morris ("Morris Decl.") ¶ 1.			
10	Since then, Andrew and his wife incorporated plaintiff Seattle Vacation Home, LLC.			
11	The business has grown to manage 12 properties owned by Andrew (in most cases he is a			
12	minority investor together with friends or family), as well as properties that he does not own,			
13	but that others entrust Seattle Vacation Home to manage. <i>Id.</i> \P 2. Seattle Vacation Home lists			
14	the properties it manages on multiple digital platforms, including HomeAway, Airbnb, and			
15	others. <i>Id.</i> ¶ 3. The properties offered by Seattle Vacation Home range from small 1-bedroom			
16	apartments to large 8-bedroom single-family homes. <i>Id.</i> \P 4.			
17	Specifically, the short-term rental properties (collectively the "Properties") that are			
18	owned or co-owned by Andrew and are located in Seattle at the following addresses:			
19	2606 East Thomas Street, Unit 1;			
20	2606 East Thomas Street, Unit 2;			
21	2606 East Thomas Street, Unit 3;			
22	2606 East Thomas Street, Unit 4;			
23	1728 23rd Avenue;			
24	215A 26th Avenue East;			
25	226B 26th Avenue East;			
26	129A 26th Avenue East;			
27	127A 26th Avenue East;			
28	127B 26th Avenue East;			
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1612 26th Avenue; and,

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1116 25th Avenue. *Id.* ¶ 5.

The Properties are located within the City of Seattle and are not included in Downtown
or First Hill exclusionary zones. *Id.* ¶ 6. Seattle Vacation Home contracts with other local
entrepreneurs to maintain and clean the Properties. These entrepreneurs professionally clean
every unit after every rental and conduct repairs as necessary. *Id.* ¶ 7.

7 Over the course of its existence, Seattle Vacation Home has managed approximately 8 5,300 bookings. The company carefully tracks and responds to any problems with its rentals. 9 Over the course of over 5,300 bookings at the Properties, the police have been summoned only 10 once (by Andrew himself, when a loud party needed to be evicted). Neighbors have complained 11 approximately 10 times over excessive noise; and fewer than 10 complaints have been made 12 over other minor problems like garbage bags being left in the wrong location by renters. Id. $\P 8$. 13 The company takes all complaints seriously and works quickly and directly with guests, 14 neighbors, and the City to resolve them. Id. ¶ 9. To date, none have related to a serious crime, 15 continuous or repeated noise or other nuisances, or resulted in a fine or prosecution of any sort. 16 Id.

Seattle Vacation Home is the primary source of income for Andrew and his wife. *Id.* ¶
10. Their lives changed on December 11, 2017, when Seattle passed sweeping new restrictions
on short-term rentals when it adopted Ordinance No. 125490, which is the subject of this
lawsuit. *Id.* ¶ 11.

The new rules are codified at Seattle Municipal Code Chapter 6.600 et seq. Ordinance
No. 125490 defines a short-term rental as "a lodging use, that is not a hotel or motel, in which a
dwelling unit, or portion thereof, that is offered or provided to a guest(s) by a short-term rental
operator for a fee for fewer than 30 consecutive nights." Seattle, Wash. Mun. Code §
6.600.030.

Ordinance No. 125490, which took effect on January 1, 2019, restricts the number of
units that a property owner may dedicate to short-term rentals. Under the law, an owner will
only be able to rent their primary residence plus two other properties as short-term rentals (the

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"two-property rule"). *Id.* § 6.600.040.B.1. The restrictions treat married couples as a single
person, meaning that Andy and his wife are limited to two properties since they are married,
whereas they could own four properties between them if they were not. *Id.* § 6.600.030. The
restrictions treat majority owners in a property the same as minority owners. *Id.* Thus, a person
who owned only a 1% stake in two different properties would, under the rule, be precluded from
owning any more properties for short-term rentals.

7 The penalty for violating the two-property rule is \$500 per day for the first ten days, and
8 \$1,000 per day beyond that. *Id.* § 6.600.110.B.4.a.

9 The two-property rule applies everywhere in the City, with two exceptions. In the
10 Downtown Urban Center and First Hill neighborhoods, existing owners will have all of their
11 short-term rental units grandfathered in, meaning they will not be limited to renting their
12 primary residence plus two units when the Ordinance takes effect. *Id.* §§ 6.600.040.B.2 & B.3.
13 In other words, if homeowners were renting more than two units prior to September 30, 2017,
14 they can continue to do so – but only if their properties are in the Downtown or First Hill
15 neighborhoods. *Id.*

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IV. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON

Plaintiffs' rely on the Affidavit of Andrew Morris, Appendix 1 to this motion, and theother pleadings and papers on file with the Court in this action.

19 **V. ISSUES**

There are two issues before the Court:

1. Should summary judgment be granted to the City without any factual development?

- 22 2. Has the Washington Supreme Court silently abandoned the three-part *Presbytery* test
 23 for analyzing substantive due process claims, involving private property rights, under
 24 the Washington Constitution?
- 25 VI. ARGUMENT

The City's motion for summary judgment should be denied as premature because all three of Plaintiffs' claims require factual development, and that development has been stayed by agreement and stipulation of the parties. Plaintiffs' state due process claim is controlled by the

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substantive, three-part analysis in *Presbytery*. Their federal substantive due process claim is
 controlled by an analysis into whether the law "substantially advances" the asserted
 governmental interest. And their claim under the privileges and immunities clause of the
 Washington Constitution—while subject to rational basis review—still requires the Court to
 allow Plaintiffs the opportunity to demonstrate the irrationality of the City's asserted
 justifications for the law.

7 Indeed, even if the City were correct—which it is not—that rational basis review
8 controls *all* of the claims in this case, that would *not* mean that factual development is
9 unnecessary. And it would not mean that the Court could decide the case without the Plaintiffs
10 being given the chance to proffer evidence that would support their claims.

11 Additionally, Plaintiffs address herein the question that initially prompted the agreed 12 stay of discovery, namely: Does Presbytery still control substantive due process claims, 13 involving property rights, under the Washington Constitution? Contrary to the City's argument, 14 the Washington Supreme Court has not silently abandoned *Presbytery*'s three-part substantive 15 due process analysis. Instead, both Washington courts and federal courts have continued to 16 apply Presbytery in an unbroken, near-30 year line of precedent. And under Presbytery, the 17 parties will need significant factual development in order to determine whether the City can 18 satisfy all three prongs of the *Presbytery* test, as it is required to do.

19 20

A. Under any standard of constitutional review, the parties need to develop evidence before summary judgment could be granted.

21 Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine disputes of fact. In 22 re Marriage of Ferree, 71 Wn. App. 35, 43–44, 856 P.2d 706, 710–11 (1993). The moving 23 party—here the Defendants—bear the burden of "produc[ing] affidavits, declarations or other 24 cognizable materials that show the absence of a genuine dispute of fact." *Id.* But at this stage, 25 summary judgment is particularly inappropriate because the parties have agreed to postpone 26 discovery of facts necessary to prove up the allegations in the complaint. "[A] motion for 27 summary judgment follows commencement of an action and some opportunity for discovery." 28 Grant v. Alperovich, 180 Wn. App. 1041, 2014 WL 1711403, at *4 (2014). The City's request PLS.' CROSS-MOT. SUMM. J. & **GOLDWATER INSTITUTE** RESPONSE TO CITY'S MOT. SUMM. J. - 6

500 East Coronado Road Phoenix, Arizona 85004 602-462-5000 for full summary judgment is premature. The parties have stipulated that discovery would be
 stayed until the proper standards of review in this case could be determined on cross-motions
 for summary judgment.

4 The City's motion should only be granted if the Court believes that the City is correct on 5 two points: that rational basis review controls all claims in this case, and that such review means 6 that the Court need not review the evidence that would have been presented by the parties. 7 Because neither of these things is true, the City's motion should be denied. As Plaintiffs show 8 below, evidentiary development is needed on all three of their claims. A "trial court has a duty 9 to give [a] party a reasonable opportunity to complete the record before ruling on [a] motion 10 [for summary judgment]." Turner v. Kohler, 54 Wn. App. 688, 693, 775 P.2d 474, 476 (1989), 11 citing Lewis v. Bell, 45 Wn. App. 192, 196, 724 P.2d 425 (1986), and Cofer v. Cnty. of Pierce, 8 12 Wn. App. 258, 262-63, 505 P.2d 476, 478-79 (1973). At present, due to the agreed stay of 13 discovery, there remains a dispute of fact that precludes summary judgment.

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1. The state substantive due process claim cannot be decided without substantial evidentiary development.

16 Plaintiffs allege that the two-unit rule for short-term rentals violates the substantive due 17 process clause, Article I, Section 3, of the Washington Constitution. As explained below in Part 18 B, this claim is analyzed under the three-part test found in *Presbytery*. First, the regulation must 19 "substantially advance[]"—not just rationally relate to—"legitimate state interests." 114 Wn.2d 20 at 333. Second, the regulation must use reasonable means to achieve that purpose. Id. at 330. 21 And third, the regulation must not be unduly oppressive on the landowner. *Id.* This is a "higher 22 standard of scrutiny" than many states apply to such regulations. Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 252 n.9 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).¹ Each element of the test must be individually 23 24 scrutinized and satisfied for a law to withstand constitutional scrutiny.

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¹ Washington provides higher protection for property rights in other contexts, too, like the constitutional right to protect one's property from wild animals. *See, e.g, State v. Vander Houwen*, 163 Wn.2d 25, 33 ¶ 13, 177 P.3d 93, 97 (2008) ("the holding that one may reasonably defend property against wildlife damage is still correct law in Washington").

1 The following facts are necessary, at a minimum, to conduct an analysis under the three 2 parts of this test: What are the City's purported justifications for the two-unit rule? What is the 3 City's evidence that those interests are legitimate? How does the two-unit rule substantially 4 advance those interests? Does it advance them directly or indirectly? Are these means 5 reasonable or unreasonable? Are they effective? If the City's interests are legitimate (part one) 6 and its means of achieving those interests are reasonable (part two), the parties would still need 7 to explore the burden that the two-unit rule places on Plaintiffs. Namely, is there a burden? 8 What is the extent of the burden? Is it an undue burden? And how does the weight of the 9 burden on Plaintiffs balance against the extent to which the two-unit rule serves the public 10 interest?

11 To take a concrete example, the City has claimed that restricting the number of units that 12 a given owner (or couple) may own will help address housing affordability in Seattle. Even if 13 the Court were to find that this is a legitimate governmental interest, Ordinance 125490 must 14 still "substantially advance" that interest under Presbytery. Furthermore, the second and third 15 prongs of *Presbytery* will require a substantial evidentiary record. For the "reasonable means" 16 analysis, the parties will need to understand the City's theory of how the two-unit rule relates to 17 housing affordability. That connection is not self-evident. Plaintiffs have alleged that there is 18 no rational connection—and to prove their cases requires Plaintiffs to answer certain evidentiary 19 questions: Does the City have any evidence demonstrating a connection? What do expert 20 witnesses say about the connection, if any, between short-term rentals and housing costs? 21 These and other questions need to be answered to determine, under Presbytery's second prong, 22 whether Ordinance 125490 substantially advances the government's interest. Without a factual 23 record, this question is simply not appropriate for summary judgment at this time.

24

Likewise, to conduct the "unduly oppressive" analysis under Presbytery's third prong, 25 the parties will need to explore—through discovery—the burden that the City's new restrictions 26 place on SVH and the Morrises. The Plaintiffs have alleged that the two-property rule is an 27 irrational and arbitrary restriction on Plaintiffs' property rights. They should have the 28 opportunity to prove up their allegations through the following evidence that they plan to obtain

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1 in discovery, including: expert testimony that analyzes the Seattle housing market and any 2 effect that short-term rentals might have on it; depositions of the City to probe and test its 3 theories of public benefit; evidence to refute any additional bases for the law that the City might 4 assert during the discovery process; an analysis of the burdens that complying with the two-unit 5 rule place on Plaintiffs; and an examination of the *extent* of any public benefit that the City 6 alleges the law might serve. These are fact-intensive inquiries that require discovery. Because 7 the parties have agreed to stay discovery, these causes of action are not proper for summary 8 judgment at this time.

9 10

2. The federal substantive due process claim cannot be decided without substantial evidentiary development.

11 Plaintiffs' federal substantive due process claim is controlled by a standard of review 12 that demands evidence. Contrary to the City's claims, federal law uses the "substantially 13 advances" test to determine the constitutionality of land-use regulations, and not rational basis 14 review. See Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) ("[I]t must be 15 said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly 16 arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or 17 general welfare."); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498 n.6 (1977) ("Euclid held 18 that land-use regulations violate the Due Process Clause if they are 'clearly arbitrary and 19 unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general 20 welfare" (citation omitted)); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187–88 (1928) 21 (same).

Under "substantially advances" review, evidence matters. The property owner may
"proffer[] evidence sufficient to rebut each of the [government's] reasons" for enacting the
regulation. *City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.*, 526 U.S. 687, 687–88
(1999). This means that Plaintiffs should be afforded the opportunity to, at a minimum, conduct
discovery and work with expert witnesses to rebut the City's asserted bases for enacting the
short-term rental restrictions.

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1 In practice, this will not look all that different than prongs one and two of the *Presbytery* 2 test. Plaintiffs are still entitled to explore whether the City's justifications actually and 3 substantially advance the interests the City asserts. Returning to the previous example: The City 4 asserts that the two-unit rule addresses housing affordability. Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 5 ("DMSJ") at 17–20. Plaintiffs should have the opportunity to probe whether this is true. Do 6 more short-term rentals mean less-affordable housing? This dispute of material fact precludes 7 summary judgment at this stage of the litigation. This allegation must be proven by evidence, 8 including testimony from expert witnesses. For instance, Plaintiffs anticipate that their expert 9 witness would need to examine the size of the Seattle housing market, compare that to the size 10 of the Seattle short-term rental market, and perform the relevant analysis to determine whether 11 short-term rentals have a positive or negative effect on housing prices. Similarly, Plaintiffs 12 anticipate that they will need to conduct an entity deposition of the City in order to understand 13 the City's evidence supporting a connection between more short-term rentals and higher 14 housing costs. Also important will be the question of whether short-term rentals contribute 15 meaningfully or negligibly to any increase in housing costs. These are evidence-intensive 16 inquiries that require discovery. "The court must read the parties' submissions in the light most 17 favorable to the nonmoving party, and determine whether reasonable minds could reach but one 18 conclusion." In re Marriage of Ferree, 71 Wn. App. at 44 (internal citations omitted). Because 19 that is not the case here—at this stage of the litigation—summary judgment must be denied.

20 Plaintiffs also allege that if there is any connection between short-term rentals and 21 overall housing costs, it does not rise to the level of being "substantial," such that the two-unit 22 rule will meaningfully address housing affordability in Seattle. Again, this allegation must be 23 proven by evidence. At this stage of the litigation, neither party knows the answers to these 24 questions because the parties have agreed to stay discovery. Therefore, a factual dispute 25 remains at this point which precludes summary judgment. Miller v. Indiana Ins. Cos., 31 Wash. 26 App. 475, 479, 642 P.2d 769, 771 (1982). Instead, this case should go forward as the parties 27 agreed: after the appropriate legal standard is established, the parties should have an opportunity 28

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1	to conduct discovery and enable the Plaintiffs to prove up their allegations so that the Court can				
2	determine whether Plaintiffs' claims have merit.				
3 4	3. The state privileges and immunities claim cannot be decided without Plaintiffs being given a chance to negate the City's asserted bases for carving out certain neighborhoods and discriminating against				
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	married couples. The City paints rational basis review as a toothless standard under which the plaintiffs are not afforded an opportunity to rebut the government's asserted justifications for a law. DMSJ at 15–16. This is a common misconception. In actuality, federal and state courts have been clear that rational-basis review is a meaningful standard and that, while that standard is deferential to the government, claims subject to rational-basis review nevertheless warrant genuine legal scrutiny <i>and factual analysis</i> . The City argues that the state rational basis test mirrors the federal test. It does not. <i>Id</i> . at 10. But even if it does, that does not render it a hollow standard. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in plaintiffs' favor in at least 20 privileges-and-immunities cases since 1970. ² There are at least three circumstances under which this occurs: (1) the absence of a logical connection				
16 17 18	between the asserted governmental interest and the law ³ ; (2) the law imposes a public harm that ² See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 774 (2013); <i>id.</i> at 793-94 (Scalia, J., dissenting)				
 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 	 (noting that the Court relied on rational-basis review); <i>Lawrence v. Texas</i>, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); <i>United States v. Morrison</i>, 529 U.S. 598, 614-15 (2000); <i>Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech</i>, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000); <i>Romer v. Evans</i>, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996); <i>United States v. Lopez</i>, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995); <i>Quinn v. Millsap</i>, 491 U.S. 95, 108 (1989); <i>Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cnty. Comm'n of Webster Cnty.</i>, <i>W. Va.</i>, 488 U.S. 336, 345 (1989); <i>City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.</i>, 473 U.S. 432, 449-50 (1985); <i>Hooper v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor</i>, 472 U.S. 612, 623 (1985); <i>Williams v. Vermont</i>, 472 U.S. 14, 24-25 (1985); <i>Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward</i>, 470 U.S. 869, 880 (1985); <i>Plyler v. Doe</i>, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982); <i>Zobel v. Williams</i>, 457 U.S. 55, 61-63 (1982); <i>Chappelle v. Greater Baton Rouge Airport Dist.</i>, 431 U.S. 159 (1977) (per curiam); <i>U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno</i>, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); <i>James v. Strange</i>, 407 U.S. 128, 141-42 (1972); <i>Lindsey v. Normet</i>, 405 U.S. 56, 77-78 (1972); <i>Mayer v. City of Chi.</i>, 404 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1971); <i>Reed v. Reed</i>, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971); <i>Turner v. Fouche</i>, 396 U.S. 346, 363-64 (1970). ³ See, e.g., Zobel, 457 U.S. at 62 (rejecting Alaska's argument that long-time residents deserved 				
28	a larger share of state oil revenues than newcomers). PLS.' CROSS-MOT. SUMM. J. & GOLDWATER INSTITUTE RESPONSE TO CITY'S MOT. SUMM. J 11 500 East Coronado Road Phoenix, Arizona 85004 602-462-5000				

vastly outweighs any conceivable public benefit⁴; and (3) the law simply lacks a legitimate
 governmental interest.⁵

3 Furthermore, the Court does not apply the rational basis test purely in the abstract. 4 Instead, a court facing a rational basis challenge like this one must adjudicate the 5 constitutionality of the challenged law by looking at the evidence and the wider statutory 6 background. "[E]ven in the ordinary equal protection case calling for the most deferential of 7 standards," courts "insist on knowing the relation between the classification adopted and the 8 object to be attained," and the answer depends on whether the challenged law is "narrow 9 enough in scope and grounded in a sufficient factual context for [the Court] to ascertain some 10 relation between the classification and the purpose it serve[s]." Romer, 517 U.S. at 632-33 11 (emphasis added). The Court has made clear for 80+ years that the rational basis test "is a presumption of fact. ... As such it is a rebuttable presumption." Borden's Farm Prod. Co. v. 12 13 Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 209 (1934) (emphasis added).

While a plaintiff certainly bears the evidentiary burden, the government's *mere assertion*that a law serves a legitimate purpose is *never* enough to entitle it to judgment, even under the
rational basis test. *Craigmiles v. Giles*, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658, 662 (E.D. Tenn. 2000), *aff'd*, 312
F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002) ("the mere assertion of a legitimate government interest has never been
enough to validate a law."); *Nunez-Reyes v. Holder*, 646 F.3d 684, 715 (9th Cir. 2011), (en
banc) (Pregerson, C.J., dissenting) (Courts "cannot allow 'rational basis review' to serve as a
rubber stamp.")

Plaintiffs may adduce evidence to refute the government's asserted rationales. *United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.*, 304 U.S. 144, 152–54 (1938) ("Where the existence of a rational

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⁴ See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230 (rejecting government's argument that it could save money by denying public education to undocumented immigrants and finding that interest "wholly insubstantial in light of the costs involved to these children, the State, and the Nation" from creating a subclass of illiterates.").

⁵ See, e.g., In Metro. Life Ins. Co., 470 U.S. at 878 (invalidating Alabama law that protected state insurance companies from out-of-state competition on the basis that economic protectionism was not a legitimate governmental interest).

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basis for legislation whose constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts ... such facts may
properly be made the subject of judicial inquiry, and the constitutionality of a statute ... may be
challenged by showing to the court that those facts have ceased to exist [or] ... by proof of facts
tending to show that the statute...is without support in reason." (internal citations omitted)).

5 Likewise, Washington courts do not apply a meaningless, government-always-wins 6 standard to rational basis cases. Even though the test is "highly deferential to the legislature," 7 the challenging party must still be afforded an opportunity to "to show it is purely arbitrary." 8 *In re Det. of Thorell*, 149 Wn.2d 724, 749, 72 P.3d 708, 721 (2003). This means the 9 challenging party may introduce evidence of irrationality by proving facts that negate the 10 government's proffered justifications. For instance, in Willoughby v. Dep't of Labor & Indus. 11 of the State of Wash., the Washington Supreme Court rejected all of the government's proffered 12 justifications for denying permanent disability benefits to certain prisoners, but not others, 13 because, in light of the evidence, the government "fail[ed] to provide a rational basis for the 14 statutory distinction." 147 Wn.2d 725, 741, 57 P.3d 611, 619 (2002). Thus, even if the City is 15 right, and rational-basis review applies, summary judgment cannot be entered without a fully 16 developed factual record.

17 Plaintiffs allege that the City has violated the state privileges and immunities clause in 18 two ways: First, by carving out grandfathered units in the Downtown Urban Center and First 19 Hill neighborhoods from the two-unit rule; and second, by treating married individuals as one 20 owner for purposes of the two-unit rule. In its motion, the City asserts that the carve-out serves 21 the governmental interest of "having that area serve as a tourist and convention attraction and a 22 regional hub of cultural and entertainment activities." DMSJ at 20. It asserts that the disparate 23 treatment for married individuals is necessary in order to "prevent[][married individuals]... from essentially double-dipping." Plaintiffs, however, dispute as a factual matter whether these 24 25 rules actually serve these government interests. Compl. ¶¶ 57–58. Whether these rules do 26 rationally serve those legitimate interests is a matter to be determined on the basis of an 27 evidentiary record. For example, it must be determined based on an assessment of whether the 28 carve-out can be rationally believed to increase the amount of cultural and entertainment

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activities. While the government gets deference on that question, the Plaintiffs are entitled to
 obtain and submit evidence to substantiate their position that the carve-out does not serve those
 interests.

4 For example, Plaintiffs contend that treating certain neighborhoods differently does not, 5 as a factual matter, rationally relate to encouraging and support tourism. Plaintiffs also contend 6 that discriminating against married couples does not serve any legitimate governmental interest.⁶ They intend to obtain evidence—including statistics relating to tourism and testimony 7 8 from experts relating to the consequences of Ordinance 125490's discriminatory rules, to prove 9 their case. But at the summary judgment stage, this Court must construe all facts in the light 10 most favorable to the non-moving party, Mulcahy v. Farmers Insurance Co. of Washington, 152 11 Wn.2d 92, 98; 95 P.3d 313, 316 (2004), and grant summary judgment "only if, from all of the 12 evidence, reasonable persons could reach but one conclusion." Duncan v. Alaska USA Fed. 13 *Credit Union*, 148 Wn. App. 52, 60 ¶ 15, 199 P.3d 991, 995 (2008). That is not the case here. 14 Plaintiffs dispute the Defendants' factual (and legal) claims, and this Court cannot adjudicate 15 the case on the merits before the parties are afforded a chance to conduct discovery.

16 17

B. The Washington Supreme Court did not silently abandon the three-part *Presbytery* test for substantive due process claims involving property rights.

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18 Turning to the issue that prompted these cross-motions, and the agreed stay of discovery, 19 Plaintiffs' substantive due process claim is appropriately analyzed under the test established by 20 the Washington Supreme Court, in Presbytery, 114 Wn.2d 320. In the property rights context, 21 substantive due process claims are appropriate even where a taking has not occurred, if the 22 owner's right to use property has been restricted arbitrarily or in ways that lack a 23 constitutionally adequate relationship to a constitutionally legitimate interest. As the 24 Washington Supreme Court noted, "even if [a] regulation protects the public from harm, and 25 ⁶ Plaintiffs dispute the City's claim that what the City calls "double dipping" by married couples 26 is a harm that the City can legitimately address. There is no evident reason why two single people should be allowed to rent four properties, while those same people should only be 27 allowed to rent two properties once they get married. Again, resolution of this question depends

on factual determinations that are premature prior to discovery.

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RESPONSE TO CITY'S MOT. SUMM. J. - 14

28

1 2	does not deny the owners a fundamental attribute of ownership (and is thus insulated from a 'takings' challenge), it still must withstand the due process test of reasonableness." <i>Id.</i> at 330.			
2	'takings' challenge), it still must withstand the due process test of reasonableness." Id. at 330.			
	'takings' challenge), it still must withstand the due process test of reasonableness." Id. at 330.			
3	The <i>Presbytery</i> test was reaffirmed by the Washington Supreme Court in <i>Guimont v</i> .			
4	Clarke, 121 Wn.2d 586, 854 P.2d 1 (1993). There, a group of property owners challenged a			
5	state law that required the owners of mobile home parks to provide relocation assistance to			
6	residence whenever a park was closed. The court found that, although the law did not constitute			
7	a taking, it did violate the substantive due process rights of the owners of the mobile home			
8	parks. The Court found that "addressing the statewide problem of relocation expenses			
9	associated with mobile home park closings" was a legitimate government interest, id. at 609, but			
10	that the "more difficult issue here is whether it is reasonably necessary to require the assistance			
11	to be paid by the closing park owner." <i>Id.</i> at 610. In order to conduct that analysis, it was			
12	necessary to "turn to the third due process question, that of undue oppression." <i>Id.</i>			
13	The undue oppression analysis looks at "a number of nonexclusive factors to weigh the			
14	fairness of the burden being placed on the property owner." <i>Id.</i> Quoting <i>Presbytery</i> , the Court			
15	explained that:			
16	If the public s side, the seriousness of the public problem, the extent to which the			
17	owner's land contributes to it, the degree to which the proposed regulation solves it and the feasibility of less oppressive solutions would all be relevant. On the			
18	owner's side, the amount and percentage of value loss, the extent of remaining uses, past, present and future uses, temporary or permanent nature of the			
19	regulation, the extent to which the owner should have anticipated such regulation and how feasible it is for the owner to alter present or currently planned uses.			
20	Id. at 610 (quoting 114 Wash.2d at 331). This is a fact-intensive analysis that requires both			
21	sides of the dispute to produce actual evidence to support, or discredit, the landowner's claim of			
22	undue burden.			
23	1. An uninterrupted line of caselaw continues to apply the <i>Presbytery</i>			
24	test.			
25	Since Presbytery was decided in 1990, both state and federal courts continue to apply it			
26	to substantive due process claims involving property rights, under the Washington Constitution.			
27	Most recently, the Ninth Circuit applied Presbytery when applying Washington state law in			
28	Laurel Park Community, LLC v. City of Tumwater, 698 F.3d 1180, 1193-96 (9th Cir. 2012).			
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	RESPONSE TO CITY'S MOT. SUMM. J 15 500 East Coronado Road Phoenix, Arizona 85004			
	602-462-5000			

1 There, the owners of mobile home parks challenged a law that zoned mobile home parks in a 2 way that allowed only that use on the property. Earlier versions of the zoning permitted 3 multiple uses, meaning that mobile home parks could be transformed into more expensive, 4 permanent subdivisions and other higher-value uses. By disallowing any use other than mobile 5 homes, the city council hoped to prevent closure of the parks and thereby address the issue of 6 affordable housing in the city. Even though the case was brought in federal court under the U.S. 7 Constitution, because it originated in Washington, the Ninth Circuit applied the *Presbytery* 8 analysis.

9 That same year, the Washington Court of Appeals considered a substantive due process 10 case involving a construction permit to place a mobile home on private land. Cradduck v. 11 Yakima Cnty., 166 Wn. App. 435, 271 P.3d 289 (2012). The county had placed a mobile home 12 park in a floodplain, which prevented new construction from occurring there. The appellate 13 court concluded that this was "a proper exercise of police power." *Id.* at 437 ¶ 1. To arrive at 14 that conclusion, it applied the three-part Presbytery test. As the test requires, the court found 15 that the regulation satisfied all three prongs: legitimate public purpose, reasonably necessary 16 means to achieve the purpose, and not unduly oppressive on the landowner. Id. at 442–446 ¶¶ 17 14-22.

Two years prior to *Cradduck* and *Laurel Park*, the court of appeals applied *Presbytery* in *Bayfield Resources Co. v. WWGMHB*. 158 Wn. App. 866, 244 P.3d 412 (2010). There, a
property owner objected to a rezoning of its property, which would further restrict use of the
property in order to, according to the government, "increase[e] visible open space, retain[]
wildlife habitat, and protect[] shellfish." *Id.* at 874 ¶ 12. Again, the court of appeals applied the *Presbytery* substantive due process test and found, after analyzing all three prongs of the test,
that the rezoning withstood constitutional scrutiny. *Id.* at 885–888 ¶¶ 35–44.

One year before that, the appeals court used the *Presbytery* test in *Conner v. City of Seattle*, 153 Wn. App. 673, 223 P.3d 1201 (2009). There, the City denied a request to build
additional structures on a property that was designated for historical preservation. The property
owner challenged the regulation on a number of grounds, one of which was that it failed the

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Presbytery test. Although the court found the regulations unconstitutional, it had no problem
 applying the *Presbytery* test to the facts of the case.

2

3 Two other cases also show that the Presbytery line remains unbroken. In Peste v. Mason 4 County, 133 Wn. App. 456, 136 P.3d 140 (2006), the court of appeals upheld a city's rezoning 5 of two parcels of property under *Presbytery*. "Washington case law on regulatory takings," 6 noted the court, "focuses on only the fourth fundamental attribute of property ownership—the 7 right to make some economically viable use of property-presumably because the first three 8 attributes seem far more likely to be implicated when the state physically takes property." *Id.* at 9 471 ¶ 28. Likewise, in Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, an en banc Washington Supreme Court 10 expressly endorsed *Presbytery*, despite the fact that Justice Talmadge wrote a lengthy dissent 11 arguing that it should be abandoned in favor of adopting the federal Dolan test. 131 Wn.2d 640, 12 935 P.2d 555 (1997) (majority endorsement of Presbytery at 131 Wn.2d at 664; dissent id. at 13 691).

In short, the Washington Supreme Court has had numerous opportunities to abandon or
modify the *Presbytery* test in the nearly three decades since it was decided—and has never done
so. The *Presbytery* test provides a proper balance between the rights of property owners and the
police power of government to address actual harms. It should be applied in this case on a full
record upon completion of discovery.

19 20

2. The Washington Supreme Court did not abandon the *Presbytery* test by declining to apply it in *Amunrud*.

Although the Washington Supreme Court has never affirmatively abandoned *Presbytery*,
the City argues that it *silently* abandoned the test in 2006, in *Amunrud v. Board of Appeals*, 158
Wn.2d 208, 143 P.3d 571 (2006). This is incorrect for at least three reasons. First, *Amunrud*was not a land-use case at all. Second, courts have continued to apply *Presbytery* long after *Amunrud* was decided. And third, Washington courts apply a doctrine that precedent cannot be
overturned *sub silentio*.

27

28

To the first point, the *Presbytery* analysis only applies to land use cases, and *Amunrud* was not such a case. Instead, *Amunrud* was a case about whether the government could revoke

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1 someone's driver's license due to unpaid child support. Because Amunrud was not a property 2 rights case, *Presbytery* is not even mentioned in the majority opinion. Instead, the majority 3 applied the *federal* version of rational basis review, which is consistent with what Washington 4 courts have long done in non-property rights cases. See, e.g., Seeley v. State, 132 Wn.2d 776, 5 940 P.2d 604 (1997) (marijuana law); In re Metcalf, 92 Wn. App. 165, 963 P.2d 911 (1998) 6 (deductions from prisoner wages); and Meyers v. Newport Consol. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 56-415, 7 31 Wn. App. 145, 639 P.2d 853 (1982) (teacher's dismissal). Amrund did not repudiate 8 *Presbytery* for the obvious reason that it simply did not fall within the *Presbytery* rule in the 9 first place.

Second, as shown above, courts have continued to apply *Presbytery* long after *Amunrud*was decided. In these opinions, they have never discussed whether *Amunrud* amounted to an
abandonment of *Presbytery*. Indeed, these opinions do not wrestle with *Amunrud* at all. The
City's theory that *Amunrud* overruled *Presbytery*, both silently *and without mention in subsequent decisions*, should be rejected.

Finally, Washington follows the principle that one decision will not overrule another
decision *sub silentio*. The Court "will not—and should not—overrule" existing precedents "sub
silentio." *Lunsford v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc.*, 166 Wn.2d 264, 280 ¶ 22, 208 P.3d 1092,
1101 (2009). Yet the City argues the *Amrund* Court did just that—overrule decades of
precedent *sub silentio* by not applying *Presbytery* to that case. But as shown above, the Court
did not apply *Presbytery* because it simply was not applicable outside of the property rights
context to begin with.

22

VII. CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF


The parties stipulated to a stay of discovery until standards of review could be sorted out. The City now moves for summary judgment on the theory that no discovery in this case is even needed. As shown above, that theory is simply incorrect *regardless* of which standard of review applies. Under any applicable standard of review, all three of Plaintiffs' claims require factual development. The City's motion for summary judgment should be denied as premature.

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1	In the alternative, Plaintiffs request a continuance under Civil Rule 56(f) so that discovery may		
2	be conducted, pursuant to the agreement between the parties.		
3	However, there is one important question before this Court at this stage of the litigation:		
4	Does the <i>Presbytery</i> test govern Plaintiffs' state substantive due process claims? As shown		
5	above, the Court should rule that it does, and order discovery in this case to be conducted in		
6	accordance with that test.		
7			
8	DATED this 17th day of May, 2019.		
9	/s/_Matthew R. Miller * Matthew R. Miller		
10	Scharf-Norton Center for Constitutional Litigation		
11	at the GOLDWATER INSTITUTE 500 East Coronado Road		
12	Phoenix, AZ 85004 (602) 462-5000		
13	Fax - (602) 256-056 (fax) mmiller@goldwaterinstitute.org		
14			
15	<u>/s/ William C. Severson</u> William C. Severson, WSBA # 5816		
16	William C. Severson PLLC 1001 Fourth Avenue, Suite 4400		
17	Seattle, WA 98154 (206) 838-4191 bill@seversonlaw.com		
18	Attorneys for Plaintiffs		
19			
20	* Admitted pro hac vice		
21	Trial Attorneys: Matthew R. Miller		
22	Matthew K. Minter		
23			
24			
25			
26			
27			
28			
	PLS.' CROSS-MOT. SUMM. J. & GOLDWATER INSTITUTE RESPONSE TO CITY'S MOT. SUMM. J 19 500 East Coronado Road Phoenix, Arizona 85004 602-462-5000		

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
2	I certify that I electronically filed the foregoing Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Partial		
3	Summary Judgment and Response to City of Seattle's Motion for Summary Judgment and the		
4	accompanying Appendices and Declaration of Andrew Morris with the Clerk of the Court using		
5	the ECR system.		
6	I also certify that on this date, I sent a copy of this document by email to the following		
7	parties.		
8	Roger Wynne		
9	Carolyn Boies Seattle City Attorney's Office		
10	701 Fifth Ave., Ste. 2050 Seattle, WA 98104		
11	roger.wynne@seattle.gov roger.wynne@seattle.gov		
12	carolyn.boies@seattle.gov		
13	Matthew J Segal Alanna E. Peterson		
14	Pacifica Law Group LLP 1191 2 nd Ave., Ste. 2000		
15	Seattle, WA 98101 Matthew.segal@pacificalawgroup.com		
16	Alanna.peterson@pacificalawgroup.com Attorneys for Defendant City of Seattle		
17	Anomeys for Defendant City of Seame		
18	DATED this 17th day of May, 2019,		
19	DATED uns 17th day of May, 2019,		
20	/s/ Kris Schlott		
21	Kris Schlott, Paralegal		
22			
23			
24			
25			
26			
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28			
	PLS.' CROSS-MOT. SUMM. J. & GOLDWATER INSTITUTE RESPONSE TO CITY'S MOT. SUMM. J 20 500 East Coronado Road Phoenix, Arizona 85004 602-462-5000		

APPENDIX 1



1	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, pursuant to CR 30(b)(6), the deposition will be taken		
2	upon oral examination of the City of Seattle through its designated representative at the time		
3	and place stated below before an officer authorized by law to administer oaths.		
4	YOU ARE ALSO NOTIFIED that this deposition will be recorded by stenographic		
5	means and may be recorded by audio means.		
6	YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED pursuant to CR 30(b)(6), that you have the obligation		
7	to designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons who		
8	consent to testify on the deponent's behalf, to offer knowledgeable testimony regarding the		
9	following matters:		
10	1. Policies and procedures used by the City to record, monitor, investigate, and enforce its		
11	short-term rental laws and rules.		
12	2. The City's responses to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories #8 and 9, including but not limited to		
13	any facts, studies, research, and reports that would support a link between the City's		
14	asserted governmental interests and the challenged Ordinance.		
15	3. The City's governmental interests in treating married couples as one "owner" for		
16	purposes of enforcing its short-term rental laws and rules.		
17	4. The City's purported justifications for excluding grandfathered units in the Downtown		
18	Urban Core and First Hill neighborhoods from the two-unit restriction, including the		
19	City's reasons for treating grandfathered units in those neighborhoods differently than		
20	all other neighborhoods in the City.		
21			
22	DATE/TIME: January 17, 2019 at 9:00 a.m.		
23	LOCATION OF DEPOSITION: William C. Severson PLLC		
24	1001 Fourth Avenue, Suite 4400 Seattle, WA 98154		
25			
26			
27			
28	NOTICE OF 30(b)(6)GOLDWATER INSTITUTEDEPOSITION - 2500 East Coronado RoadPhoenix, Arizona 85004(602) 462-5000		

1			
2	DATED this 18th day of December, 2018.		
3	/s/ Matthew R. Miller * Matthew R. Miller		
4 5	Scharf- at the C	Norton Center for Constitutional Litigation GOLDWATER INSTITUTE st Coronado Road	
6	Phoeni	x, AZ 85004 62-5000	
7	Fax - (0	502) 256-056 (fax) r@goldwaterinstitute.org	
8	litigatio	on@goldwaterinstitute.org	
9	9 <u>/s/ Will</u> William	iam C. Severson n C. Severson, WSBA # 5816	
10	William C. Severson PLLC 1001 Fourth Avenue, Suite 4400		
11	Seattle, WA 98154 (206) 838-4191		
12	bill@seversonlaw.com		
13	Attorneys for Plaintiffs		
14	* Motion for admission <i>pro hac vice</i> pending.		
15	Trial Attorneys:		
16	Matthew R. Miller		
17	7		
18	3		
19	9		
20)		
21	1		
22	2		
23	3		
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25	5		
26	5		
27	7		
28	NOTICE OF 30(b)(6) DEPOSITION - 3	GOLDWATER INSTITUTE 500 East Coronado Road Phoenix, Arizona 85004 (602) 462-5000	

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE			
2	I certify that on this date, I sent a copy of this document by email to the following			
3	parties.			
4	Roger Wynne Michael K. Ryan			
5	Seattle City Attorney's Office 701 Fifth Ave., Ste. 2050			
6	Seattle, WA 98104			
7	roger.wynne@seattle.gov michael.ryan@seattle.gov alicia.reise@seattle.gov			
8 9	Matthew J. Segal			
10	Alanna E. Peterson Pacifica Law Group LLP 1191 2 nd Ave., Ste. 2000			
10	Seattle, WA 98101 Matthew.segal@pacificalawgroup.com			
12	Alanna.peterson@pacificalawgroup.com			
13	Attorneys for Defendant City of Seattle			
14				
15	DATED this 18th day of December, 2018,			
16	/s/ Kris Schlott			
17	Kris Schlott, Paralegal			
18				
19				
20				
21				
22 23				
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	NOTICE OF 30(b)(6)GOLDWATER INSTITUTEDEPOSITION - 4500 East Coronado RoadPhoenix, Arizona 85004(602) 462-5000			

APPENDIX 2

1 2		HONORABLE ROGER ROGOFF WITHOUT ORAL ARGUMENT March 27, 2018	
3			
4			
5			
6			
7	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT O	F THE STATE OF WASHINGTON	
8	IN AND FOR THE	E COUNTY OF KING	
9		N. 10 2 17070 2	
10	SEATTLE VACATION HOME, LLC; and ANDREW MORRIS,	No. 18-2-15979-2	
11	Plaintiff,	STIPULATION TO CHANGE TRIAL DATE AND AMEND CASE	
12	V.	SCHEDULE	
13	CITY OF SEATTLE, WASHINGTON et		
14	al. Defendants.		
15			
16	I. ST	IPULATION	
17	1. Plaintiffs Seattle Vacation Home, LLC and Andrew Morris and Defendant City of		
18	Seattle stipulate and move the Court for an amended case schedule, including a new trial date.		
19	2. LCR 4(d) provides that the Court may modify any date in the Case Schedule,		
20 21	other than the trial date, on motion of a party and for "good cause."		
21	3. LCR 40(e)(2) provides that a m	notion to change the trial date more than 28 days	
23	later than the original date shall be made in	writing to the assigned trial judge and "may be	
24	granted subject to such conditions as justice rea	quires."	
25	4. The parties intend to file cros	s-motions for summary judgment, regarding the	
26	constitutional standard of review, on an agree	ed briefing schedule, to be heard by the Court on	
27			

STIPULATION TO CHANGE TRIAL DATE AND AMEND CASE SCHEDULE- 1 20044 00031 ic225846nm

June 21, 2019. The parties have already reserved that hearing date with the Court. The parties have agreed to the following briefing schedule and word limits for their cross-motions:

Deadline	Word Limit
April 26, 2019	8,400
May 17, 2019	10,500
June 5, 2019	4,200
June 14, 2019	2,100
	April 26, 2019 May 17, 2019 June 5, 2019

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5. The parties have also agreed to a stand down on discovery and objections thereto until they can obtain rulings on the cross-motions, which may resolve or moot a number of discovery-related issues. The parties agree that good cause exists to extend the deadlines in the case schedule, including the trial date, by approximately four months, and respectfully request the Court to do so. This will allow the parties to engage in dispositive motions practice and, if the case is not resolved, will provide sufficient time for the parties to complete discovery, including depositions and expert discovery, and prepare for trial.

6.

The parties request that the case schedule be amended as follows:

22	Case Event	Current Date	Stipulated Proposed Date
23	Disclosure of Possible Primary Witnesses	January 22, 2019	August 5, 2019
24 25	Disclosure of Possible Additional Witnesses	March 4, 2019	September 9, 2019
26	Jury Demand	March 18, 2019	September 16, 2019
27	Change in Trial Date	March 18, 2019	September 16, 2019

PACIFICA LAW GROUP LLP 1191 SECOND AVENUE SUITE 2000 SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-3404 TELEPHONE: (206) 245-1700 FACSIMILE: (206) 245-1750

	scovery Cutoff	May 6, 2019	September 23, 2019
	gaging in Alternative Dispute solution	May 28, 2019	September 23, 2019
	changing Witness and Exhibit sts and Documentary Exhibits	June 3, 2019	September 30, 2019
Joi	int Confirmation of Trial Readiness	June 3, 2019	September 30, 2019
He	aring Dispositive Pretrial Motions	June 10, 2019	October 7, 2019
	int Statement of Evidence	June 17, 2019	October 14, 2019
of	ing Trial Briefs, Proposed Findings Fact and Conclusions of Law, and ry Instructions	June 17, 2019	October 14, 2019
Tri	ial Date	June 24, 2019	November 4, 2019
SC	STIPULATED this 26 th day of Ma	rch, 2019.	
		PACIFICA I	LAW GROUP LLP
		By /s/ Ma	atthew J. Segal
			w J. Segal, wsba #29797
			E. Peterson, WSBA # 46502
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		Roger Caroly 701 Fif Seattle	og <u>er D. Wynne</u> D. Wynne, wsBA #23399 n Boies Nitta, wsBA #40395 fth Ave., Ste. 2050 , WA 98104
		Roger Caroly 701 Fif Seattle roger.w	og <i>er D. Wynne</i> D. Wynne, wsBA #23399 n Boies Nitta, wsBA #40395 fth Ave., Ste. 2050
		Roger Caroly 701 Fif Seattle roger.w Caroly	D. Wynne, wSBA #23399 n Boies Nitta, wSBA #40395 fth Ave., Ste. 2050 , WA 98104 wynne@seattle.gov n.Boies@seattle.gov
		Roger Caroly 701 Fif Seattle roger.w Caroly	D <u>ger D. Wynne</u> D. Wynne, wSBA #23399 n Boies Nitta, wSBA #40395 fth Ave., Ste. 2050 , WA 98104 wynne@seattle.gov
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1	
2	By <u>/s/ Matthew R. Miller</u> Matthew R. Miller
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	STIPULATION TO CHANGE TRIAL DATE AND AMEND CASE SCHEDULE- 4 PACIFICA LAW GROUP LLP 1191 SECOND AVENUE SUITE 2000 SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-3404

			HONORABLE ROGER WITHOUT ORAL ARC
			MARCH
IN THE SUPERIO	R COURT O	F THE STATE	E OF WASHINGTON
IN A	ND FOR THI	E COUNTY O	F KING
SEATTLE VACATION HOME, and ANDREW MORRIS,	LLC;	No. 18-2-	15979-2
	Plaintiff,		TO CHANGE TRIAL DA
v.			END CASE SCHEDULE
CITY OF SEATTLE, WASHING	GTON et	[PROPOS	SED]
ıl. De	efendants.	CLERK'S	S ACTION REQUIRED
	tion to Change	e Trial Date an	d Amend Case Schedule,
BASED upon the Stipulat	tion to Change		
nereby ORDERED:	-		
hereby ORDERED: 1. The Court will hear the pa	arties cross-m	otions for sum	mary judgment on June 21
hereby ORDERED: 1. The Court will hear the part The briefing schedule for the part	arties cross-m	otions for sum tions is as follo	mary judgment on June 21
hereby ORDERED: 1. The Court will hear the part The briefing schedule for the part Pleading	arties cross-m ties' cross-mo	otions for sum tions is as follo Deadline	mary judgment on June 21 ows: Word Limit
hereby ORDERED: 1. The Court will hear the part The briefing schedule for the part	arties cross-m ties' cross-mo	otions for sum tions is as follo	mary judgment on June 21
hereby ORDERED: 1. The Court will hear the part The briefing schedule for the part Pleading Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion	arties cross-m ties' cross-mo	otions for sum tions is as follo Deadline	mary judgment on June 21 ows: Word Limit
hereby ORDERED: 1. The Court will hear the part The briefing schedule for the part Pleading Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment	arties cross-m ties' cross-mo	otions for sum tions is as follo Deadline 26, 2019	mary judgment on June 21 ows: Word Limit 8,400
hereby ORDERED: 1. The Court will hear the part The briefing schedule for the part Pleading Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion and Response to Defendant's Motion	arties cross-mo ties' cross-mo April 2 n May 1	otions for sum tions is as follo Deadline 26, 2019 7, 2019	mary judgment on June 21 ows: Word Limit 8,400 10,500
hereby ORDERED: 1. The Court will hear the part The briefing schedule for the part Pleading Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion and Response to	arties cross-mo ties' cross-mo April 2 n May 1 June 5	otions for sum tions is as follo Deadline 26, 2019	mary judgment on June 21 ows: Word Limit 8,400

SCHEDULE [PROPOSED]- 1 20044 00031 ic253446zh PACIFICA LAW GROUP LLP 1191 SECOND AVENUE SUITE 2000 SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-3404 TELEPHONE: (206) 245-1700 FACSIMILE: (206) 245-1750

Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of its Cross-Motion	June 14, 2019	2,100

2. The following amended case schedule will govern this case going forward:

Case Event	Amended Due Date
Disclosure of Possible Primary Witnesses	August 5, 2019
Disclosure of Possible Additional Witnesses	September 9, 2019
Jury Demand	September 16, 2019
Change in Trial Date	September 16, 2019
Discovery Cutoff	September 23, 2019
Engaging in Alternative Dispute Resolution	September 23, 2019
Exchanging Witness and Exhibit Lists and Documentary Exhibits	September 30, 2019
Joint Confirmation of Trial Readiness	September 30, 2019
Hearing Dispositive Pretrial Motions	October 7, 2019
Joint Statement of Evidence	October 14, 2019
Filing Trial Briefs, Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Jury Instructions	October 14, 2019
Trial Date	November 4, 2019

DATED this _____ day of _____, 2019.

Honorable ROGER ROGOFF Superior Court Judge

ORDER TO CHANGE TRIAL DATE AND AMEND CASE SCHEDULE [PROPOSED]- 2 20044 00031 ic253446zh

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	ORDER TO CHANGE TRIAL DATE AND AMEND CASE SCHEDULE [PROPOSED]- 3 20044 00031 ic253446zh

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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING

SEATTLE VACATION HOME ET ANO	
-	Case No.: 18-2-15979-2 SEA
	CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE
CITY OF SEATTLE ET AL	(AFSR)

I, Matthew Miller, certify that I initiated electronic service of the following document(s) on the parties listed below who have consented to accept electronic service via the King County eFiling Application. Service was initiated on May 17, 2019 at 04:29:09 PM.

Document(s):

- 1. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
- 2. DECLARATION OF ANDREW MORRIS RE CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Parties:

- 1. Matthew Miller, Petitioner/Plaintiff email: litigation@goldwaterinstitute.org
- 2. Mathew Segal, Attorney for Respondent/Defendant email: matthew.segal@pacificalawgroup.com
- 3. Alanna Peterson, Attorney for Respondent/Defendant email: alanna.peterson@pacificalawgroup.com
- 4. Roger Wynne, Attorney for Respondent/Defendant email: roger.wynne@seattle.gov
- 5. William Severson, Petitioner/Plaintiff email: bill@seversonlaw.com

Executed this 17th day of May, 2019.

<u>s/ Matthew Miller</u> 500 E. Coronado Rd. Phoenix, AZ 85004 602-462-5000 litigation@goldwaterinstitute.org